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Heraclius and the Evolution of Byzantine Strategy
Abstract
The Byzantine military strategy expressed in the 10th century treatise On Skirmishing marked a decisive shift
in Byzantine strategy and an entirely new mindset in approaching war. What is unique about this strategy is
that it was not created during a war against the Arabs, but before they existed as a military power. The
foundation was laid during the Emperor Heraclius's Persian campaigns of 622-628. To demonstrate the key
contributions of Heraclius, these Persian campaigns shall be analyzed and compared with the advice
prescribed in On Skirmishing. Also, the military events recorded by Theophanes of the 7th and 8th centuries
will be compared with Heraclius and On Skirmishing to show the development of the strategy after Heraclius
and how it measured up to the final form in On Skirmishing.
This article is available in Constructing the Past: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/constructing/vol10/iss1/11
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Heraclius and the Evolution of the Middle Byzantine Art of War 
Bob Ekkebus 
 
 While much of the continual successes of the Byzantines in the 9th and 
10th centuries after the colossal failures in the 7th and 8th centuries can be and has 
been attributed to the Theme system and the overall decline of the Caliphate, the 
untold story of success lies in the evolution and perfection of a standard doctrine 
of military strategy uniquely adapted to border warfare.   This strategical 
doctrine, enclosed in a treatise called On Skirmishing, was written during the 
reign of Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969). It is, in the words of the author, “Our 
part by writing down these things just as our predecessors handed them on to us, 
as well as from our own experience which goes back a long time.”1 It is self-
evident that On Skirmishing is the enclosure of the knowledge of Byzantine 
strategy from a general's perspective, and the author frequently alludes to the use 
of this knowledge, in one form or another, in the past.2 
 However, it is also clear that the Byzantines had an overall concept of 
skirmishing and that the treaty was not just the enclosure of many unrelated 
strategical concepts together, but rather a unified strategical theory which had 
been refined over many generations. In essence, one could describe it as the 
Middle Byzantine Strategy or Art of War.3  As the author explains, it was only 
in the 10th century when the strategy was perfected:  
 
To the best of my knowledge, it was Bardas, the blessed 
Caesar, who brought this method to the summit of perfection.  
I do not want to enumerate all the ancient commanders but 
shall limit myself to those in our time whom everyone knows.  
When this method had completely vanished, it was Bardas 
who brought it back.4 
                                                
1 Nicephorus Phocas, On Skirmishing, edition, translation, and notes by G. T. Dennis, 
Three Byzantine Military Treatises, CFHB (Washington D.C., 1985), 211. 
2  Ibid, 147. “Nonetheless, in order that time, which leads us to forget what we once knew, 
might not completely blot out this useful knowledge, we think we ought to commit it to writing.”  
For a modern interpretation of this, see Jason Moralee, “Military Requisitioning and its 
Consequences in the Byzantine Borderlands 500-1000” (Graduate Paper, UCLA, 1997), 19-20. 
“Anyone who reads these treatises eventually begins to question their historical validity.  How much 
in them is 'tradition?' How much is 'reality?' There is no doubt that the treatises lift information from 
a long Graeco-Roman tradition of strategic theory, and that they are prescriptive in nature.” 
3 The distinct lack of contribution towards this Art of War from Belisarius and Narses, 
whose campaigns in the 6th century are skilled  enough to still teach lessons to generals of today, 
show a distinct difference in the warfare practiced before Heraclius and after due to the vastly 
changed eastern frontier after the Arab invasions in the 7th century.  Thus it is more applicable to 
describe On Skirmishing as the Middle Byzantine Empire's Art of War. 
4  Ibid, 149.  By referring to him as 'Caesar' it is clear that this is Bardas Phocas the Elder 
who was proclaimed Caesar by Nicephorus II Phocas, which fits in the time line as Bardas Phocas 
the Younger came after Nicephorus II Phocas, during whose reign this treatise was written.  The part 
about the method vanishing is likely, although not for certain, referring to the late 8th and early 9th 
centuries under Irene and later the iconoclast disputes, when military matters were put to the side in 
favor of religion. 
74       Bob Ekkebus  
 
Note how he specifically phrases it as “this method” and that it was “brought to 
the summit of perfection” and that it was used, at least in some form, by ancient 
commanders.  While the treatise itself may appear as a scattered list of assorted 
concepts which may or may not directly relate to one another, the Byzantines 
themselves viewed it as their method of war as a whole.  Not a set of concepts, 
could be brought to perfection. So despite the fact that originally all the 
Byzantines may have gotten was a long list of various concepts at various points 
in time, there was a gradual amalgamation and refinement of centuries of 
knowledge into one final form. 
 This paper aims to be an initial stepping stone in the understanding of 
the foundation and evolution of Byzantine strategy. By highlighting this change 
of strategy, it is much easier to understand why Byzantium was so successful in 
holding their difficult position in the 7th and 8th centuries and eventually 
reaching a point where they could recover lost lands in the 10th.  To understand 
the starting point of this evolution, it will be necessary to first analyze the 
campaigns of Heraclius. Heraclius was a key founder of the Middle Byzantine 
Strategy expressed in On Skirmishing, and shift in Byzantine strategy after 
Heraclius was a turning point in how Byzantines fought wars.   Perhaps the most 
important part of Heraclius's contributions is the conscious decision against 
fighting at the border. Instead, it focused much less heavily on territory and 
much more on defeating the the enemy in the most efficient manner. To analyze 
the shift in strategy after Heraclius, the wars of the 8th century will be examined 
to show that the polished strategy in On Skirmishing was steadily evolving 
during what is called the 'Byzantine Dark Ages.'  The polished form of 
Byzantine strategy expressed in On Skirmishing was not born in the 10th century.  
Instead, the major concepts were formed three hundred years prior, and it took 
all of those three hundred years for it to be refined into a successful product.  
Various ideas that made up On Skirmishing were being used in the 8th century, 
but in an incomplete form. Logically, both the campaigns of Heraclius and those 
in the 8th century will be analyzed with On Skirmishing in mind, for that text is 
the culmination of Byzantine strategic thought and therefore the best guideline 
to measure the contributions to and evolutions of Byzantine strategy. 
 Modern scholarship in this specific area consists of a gaping hole.  
Excellent work has been done on both ends of the spectrum: in the 6th/7th and the 
10th/11th centuries, but the process of linking them together has been neglected. 
Thus there is much to cover in this paper, and hopefully much more can 
explored on this neglected subject of strategical change and evolution. 
 To identify the key factors and give a proper background, there will be 
an overview of On Skirmishing, Byzantine grand strategy from Heraclius and 
after, the eastern military situation during 7th-10th centuries, and an example of 
the evolution of  Byzantine strategy .  Following this will be an analysis of 
Heraclius's campaigns and a comparison of his strategies with those 
recommended in On Skirmishing.  Lastly, the military events in the 8th century 
Constructing the Past  75 
covered by Theophanes will be compared with the advice in On Skirmishing 
to track the evolution of strategy.  
            To keep an accurate perspective, it is necessary to understand that On 
Skirmishing was one of many texts that were written in the 10th century revival 
of military science.  The revival of military writings was led by Emperor Leo 
VI's Tactica, which was written around the year 900, the first known strategical 
writing since the 7th century.  It was not intended as merely an academic 
exercise, but more so as his way to improve the difficult Byzantine military 
situation.5  In the Tactica, Leo restated much of Maurice's Strategicon, and 
updated the three hundred year old text to reflect the current situation.6   A large 
number of texts followed the Tactica, among these included On Skirmishing, 
Nicephorus Phocas's other work the Praecepta militaria, the three treatises of 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, an unnamed treatise on Campaign 
Organization under Basil II, and the last being the comprehensive Tactica of 
Nicephorus Ouranos.  
 Despite the sheer number of quality treatises On Skirmishing stands 
alone in a couple aspects.  Firstly, it concerns itself exclusively with the 
Empire's strategic situation on the eastern front in the continuous war against the 
Arabs.7  Secondly, it is directly addressed to the general and focuses solely on 
how to face the enemy .   Nearly every other book before or during the military 
science revival paid at least some attention to either campaign or army 
organization. On Skirmishing provides the clearest picture of the Empire's 
strategic practices in the east, and is of the highest quality in terms of strategy 
dictated.8 
                                                
5 Sean Tougher,  Reign of Leo VI (886-912) : politics and people (BRILL, 1997), 170-1.  
6 For example,  the Strategicon had specific sections detailing how the various enemies of 
the empire normally act and what the best strategies to use against each are.  Obviously, the Empire's 
enemies had changed extensively between the late 6th and 9th centuries and here Leo could add in 
new and useful points while being faithful to the original. 
7 The author specifically refers to “the eastern regions” when addressing the subject matter 
of the text, and states that it was not applicable at the time of writing, for the Byzantines had dealt 
several stern blows to the Arabs in the late 960's.  cf. On Skirmishing, 147. 
8 The other two texts which are at this level of strategical thought are the Praecepta 
militaria and the Tactica of Ouranos, both of which focus much more heavily on battle tactics, 
something other treatises virtually ignored.  They are very useful to compare with On Skirmishing to 
see how heavily psychology was a factor in Byzantine strategy as a whole.  For more information on 
these valuable texts, see Eric McGeer, Sowing the Dragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth 
Century (Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection: Washington, D.C, 1995).  McGeer also 
notes that “the use of stratagems and ruses to wear down a superior enemy and post-pone battle until 
the moment most propitious was the trademark of Byzantine warfare, and the delaying, guerrilla 
tatics outlined by Phokas in the De velitatione [On Skirmishing] are more typical of the Byzantine 
conduct of war than the battle tactics in the Praecepta.” McGeer, 255.  These texts are not being 
analyzed because while the Byzantine strategic situation remained similar throughout the 7th through 
10th centuries, allowing the tracking of strategic evolution possible, the organization and army 
composition changed drastically and tracking the evolution of this is not applicable in the same way.  
For example, following the Arab conquests,  the only tagmata that contained heavy cavalry was that  
of Constantinople's.  However, in the 10th century the heavy cavalry elite known as the kataphraktoi 
became crucial to the general's arsenal against many foes. For more information, see McGeer 
Sowing the Dragon's Teeth, John Haldon, Byzantium at War: 600-1453 (Taylor & Francis, 2003), 
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 As for the sources on Heraclius and the 7th and 8th century, the main 
one used is that of Theophanes, whose Chronographia covers the entire time 
span.  While its attention to detail is sorely lacking at points, it gives a very good 
understanding overall, while other sources such as George of Psidia or the 
Chronicon Paschale can help fill in some missing blanks. 
 
Strategic Ideas of On Skirmishing 
 
 The strategic ideas laid forth in On Skirmishing were essentially one 
large, interrelated plan explained in various pieces.  On the whole, the strategy 
set out in On Skirmishing can be somewhat divided into two parts: the first is to 
weaken the enemy as efficiently as possible.  This is done by limiting forage, 
harassing any vulnerable detachments, utilizing favorable terrain, and constantly 
shadowing the enemy.  The second part, is to try to defeat them as efficiently as 
possible when the enemy has already been worn down.  This would be done 
using of a variety of ambushes, night attacks, blocking the enemy's retreat, and 
striking when and where they least expect it. Overall, the  plan revolved around 
the Byzantines allowing the enemy to march into their lands, while attempting to 
gain the most militarily efficient victories possible.   What is interesting about 
analyzing the 8th century campaigns is that the Byzantines, in most cases, did not 
take  all the necessary steps to achieve the best possible victories.  For example, 
they might deny the enemy forage and put them in an easy position to be 
finished off, yet they would refrain delivering from the final blow.   This is due 
to the fact that the full ideas fleshed out in On Skirmishing had not been 
developed yet. During the period of evolution the Byzantine strategy was still in 
its infancy, when various strategies were being tried out.  However, the unified, 
comprehensive plan of On Skirmishing that would be illustrated in the 10th 
century was not completed yet.9  
 There is, however, a further aspect to On Skirmishing and Byzantine 
military strategy that has not been given the attention it deserves in modern 
scholarship yet.  While there is no textual evidence of certain aspects that On 
Skirmishing suggests in Theophanes, Heraclius was the first to practice this in 
even a rudimentary form and the policy continues after him.  A brief overview 
of this grand strategy shall be mentioned here, with further analysis and the 
relation to Heraclius made in the end of the section on Heraclius.  It is an 
extremely important point to keep in mind throughout the entire paper because 
this grand strategy is the major shift made in the middle of Heraclius's reign 
(622) and was crucial for the overall Byzantine success. 
 An inherent component in the Byzantine strategy was that generals do not 
attempt to meet the enemy at the border. Instead, they were to give up territory 
                                                                                                         
and The History of Leo the Deacon:Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century, translation, 
introduction, and annotations by Alice-Mary Talbot and Dennis F. Sullivan with the Assistance of 
George T. Dennis and Stamatina McGrath, (Dumbarton Oaks: Washington, D.C., 2005). 
9 For more information on the final form of Byzantine strategy, see The History of Leo the 
Deacon. 
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to win militarily in the most efficient manner.10   It was a stressed point in On 
Skirmishing, being specifically mentioned in several places as a strategy that 
should automatically be incorporated.  The author even  said that the general 
should be using his available forces gather to buy time for the villagers, instead 
of attending to military matters first.   
 Realizing the risks to their own military longevity by this type of 
policy, the Byzantines went out of their way to preserve their economic base.  
The necessity of preserving the Byzantine peasants and economy is first 
addressed when asking this question: “What can be done if the enemy launch a 
sudden, concentrated attack...before the imperial forces have been 
assembled...?”11 In this case, the general is recommended to do the following: 
 
 Dispatch the turmarch of that region, or other officers, with 
great speed to get ahead of the enemy and, as best they can, 
evacuate and find refuge for the inhabitants of the villages and 
their flocks...Give the enemy the impression that he is getting 
ready for a battle right then [at night].  By doing this he might 
succeed in forestalling their attack and preserve the region 
unharmed...He himself should advance with selected officers 
and good horsemen and give the enemy the impression that he 
has been making preparations to fight against them in order to 
launch an attack...If there is no river or rough ground along the 
road, he should still expose himself a bit and advance as 
though to fight...By such procedures he will save the villagers 
from impending assault and from captivity, and they shall 
keep their freedom. With great precision and foresight, let him 
make his appearance and charge against them with a few 
selected horsemen, as we have said.  These will immediately 
turn tail and retreat to the strong place and the general...While 
the general is doing all this, the villagers may escape to the 
strong places and fortresses and be preserved from harm.12   
 
                                                
10 A very valid comparison of the Byzantine 7th-10th century situation is with that of the 
Roman Empire in the 4th and 5th centuries. While this is a vast simplification of the complex 
economic, political, cultural, and military interweaving into just a strategical context for both 
Empires, it is a useful exercise to understand why the Byzantine strategy was so brilliant and 
successful.  The Romans practiced a mass border defense that had worked for a number of centuries 
previously but began to fail in the 4th and 5th centuries. While the Romans may have defended 
themselves well, any major defeat on their part could lead to massive economical problems, such as 
the loss of Spain and Africa, and even victories or stalemates often lead to the destruction of its 
economic base from which it could not recover and only slide down further.  The Byzantines on the 
other hand, were not only able to stave off destruction from an extremely perilous position, but were 
actually able to support themselves again and regain the offensive in just three centuries.  The 
difference in approach and results cannot be more striking. 
11 On Skirmishing, 12.1-3 187. 
12 On Skirmishing, 12.5-53 187-9. 
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 The policy of prioritizing the safety of the Byzantine economic backbone was 
a natural part of the Theme system13 that dominated Byzantine defense in the 
Middle Empire.  However, this heavy emphasis on preserving the Byzantine 
ability to fight over a long period of time fits perfectly with the underlying 
method that makes up On Skirmishing of voluntarily conceding territory to fight 
in the most optimal way. And the results of this policy more than justify it: in 
the middle 7th-century, the Byzantines were on the verge of collapse, struggling 
to hold onto what little territory they could and barely holding off two 
successive sieges of Constantinople.  Three centuries later, they were able to 
resume offensive activities and reconquer many of their lost gains because they 





Pre-Heraclian Strategical Theory 
 
 For this paper's purposes, the analysis and coverage of early Greek 
strategical texts is out of reach.  However, it is still important to keep in mind 
and understand that the advanced level of Byzantine strategy, as scholar W.E. 
Kaegi says, “Did not suddenly appear in the seventh, ninth, or tenth centuries.”14 
Rather, it had origins far back in the earlier Greek writers such as Onasander, 
Aelian, Arrianus, and Aeneas Tacitus.15  It is a different and difficult project 
entirely to determine how much and in what areas the Middle Byzantine 
strategists owed their theories to these earlier writers and thus shall be left for 
another day. What can and should be said now is that the decision to consciously 
concede territory when necessary was only put into effect first by Heraclius and 
then by his successors.  Before Heraclius, it was standard policy to meet the 
enemy on the border, or close as one could do so to fight for every scrap of 
territory and to prevent the enemy from damaging the Byzantine economy.  
However, this policy was thrown out the window by Heraclius after over a 
decade of failures against the Persians, and his successors followed his deviation 
for the most part.  Overall, the decision to trade territory temporarily for a 
military advantage was by far the biggest shift in Byzantine strategy from the 6th 
to the 7th centuries and is of distinct Middle Byzantine origin. 
 The two texts closest to the age of Heraclius was that of the anonymous 
On Strategy, written sometime during or after Justinian's reign, and Maurice's 
Strategicon, written at the end of the 6th century.  Of these two, the Strategicon 
was much more complete and thorough, clearly aimed at future leaders, while 
On Strategy gave more of a general perspective.   
                                                
13 The Theme system was an administrative division of the Empire into numerous 
provinces, each ruled by a Strategos who had both civil and military authority.  The army of each 
Strategos worked and owned land in the Theme that they defended. 
14 Some Thoughts on Byzantine Military Strategy, 11. 
15 Ibid. 
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 A fitting intro to the overall analysis is to compare the evolution of 
ambushing tactics from an excerpt in On Strategy to the same topic in On 
Skirmishing. Despite the early age of On Strategy,16 it is still a very thorough 
description. The following is the author's take on ambushing in the 6th century:  
 
The present-day Romans, Arabs, and many other peoples 
make use of ambushes, although, in my opinion, not to great 
advantage.  They usually conceal some detachment, while the 
rest of the army moves out in the open to lead the enemy on.  
Is there a person with any intelligence who, on seeing a few 
men boldly  advancing against a large number, will not 
suspect an ambush? For this reason, they will be cautious in 
pursuing them and will not press the pursuit far. 
 For these reasons, therefore, the detachments that are 
out in the open should give the impression that they have not 
come out there intentionally but unwillingly and happen to be 
there just by chance...To make the flight seem more plausible, 
the men being pursued should drop some of their own gear, 
sword scabbards, for example, plated with tin to look like 
silver, and thick saddlebags securely fastened.  This helps not 
only in drawing on the pursers, who will believe that our men 
are in a state of panic, but even in stopping the pursuit 
altogether.17 
 
The author has obviously seen many a failed ambush, and wishes to instruct 
readers on the basic execution of the tactic. The fact that the author has to 
illustrate specifically how “a few men boldly  advancing against a large number” 
gives away the ambush shows the low level of contemporary understanding of 
ambush psychology.  As he says, how could any competent person be expected 
to fall for such an obvious lure?  To remedy this poor practice, he proposes that 
the ambushing body act as if  came across the enemy by chance. By doing so, 
the feigned retreat would be more justified in the enemy's eyes.  This plan is 
supported with fake booty, both in an attempt to simulate a real retreat and to 
make the enemy disorganized with their want for loot.  Overall, this setup is 
certainly a much better approach than the rudimentary ambush the author 
exposes at the beginning. However, it still has flaws. When one compares the 
advice in On Strategy with a similar section in On Skirmishing, the difference in 
strategic understanding is quite clear: 
 
Have him [an experienced commander] order a few of the men 
under him to dress like farmers, and mix in some real farmers 
                                                
16 It was published sometime in the mid to late 6th century, at the very least after Justinian. 
Anon, On Strategy, edition, translation, and notes by G. T. Dennis, Three Byzantine Military 
Treatises, CFHB (Washington D.C., 1985), 33.33-41, 105. 
17 On Strategy, 21. 
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and herdsmen with them.  All of them ought to be unarmed and their 
heads uncovered. Some should be barefoot.  All should be on 
horseback, carrying very short wooden staffs.  Do all this to 
deceive the enemy and to give them the impression that these 
men are not from the army but just some farmers, of the sort 
called stewards...Our men, then, who are disguised as farmers 
and peasant stewards,when the enemy have begun to follow 
them, should hurry to reach the site of the ambuscade.  There 
the enemy who are following them, caught off their guard, 
will fall right into the ambush.18 
 
While the excerpt from On Strategy is not lacking or incorrect by any 
means, it simply is a rough version made from drawing upon many 
failures and possibly some successes.  Whereas the portion selected 
from On Skirmishing is more devious, requires better training and 
discipline, and could not be expected to be executed successfully by 
those whose men or officers were not already familiar with the practice.  
The former relies upon the enemy believing soldiers stumbled across 
them by chance, and would thus flee rather than fight an outnumbered 
opponent.  This certainly could work in some situations, for the 
premise is plausible enough; however, given the excellent Byzantine 
reconnaissance system, an enemy commander would be justified in 
caution at seeing a Byzantine party randomly run into them, get 
noticed, and then flee into terrain where an ambush is likely.  On the 
other hand, the suspicion of the enemy would inherently be much lower 
on seeing a group of peasants doing the same thing.  For one, they 
would be more likely than soldiers to bump into the enemy unawares 
and give away their position, and two, their retreat into ambush friendly 
terrain would be viewed with less suspicion simply because they would 
be viewed as peasants. Thus, it makes most sense to categorize the 
former as a rough draft and the latter as a more finished copy.    As we 
shall see, the mark of progress is visible on many other aspects as well 





Heraclius's Persian Campaign 622-628 
 
                                                
18  On Skirmishing, 211-3. The focus of ambushing seems to change from On Strategy to 
On Skirmishing.  In the former, the author plans using it against enemy armies on the march.  
Whereas in the latter, it assumed to be used to prevent the enemy from plundering or foraging.  This 
represents the fundamental shift over time of what the army was capable of and from there what its 
aims were. That is not to say that that there is no place for ambushing the enemy on the march in On 
Skirmishing though. c.f On Skirmishing, 183, for additional info on how to ambush in haste. 
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 The campaigns of Heraclius, so successful that they turned a lost 
war with the enemy having captured all but Constantinople into a complete 
Byzantine victory, are the cornerstone of what would become standard 
Byzantine strategy in several key ways. 
 Modern scholarship, while praising the military brilliance of 
Heraclius's campaigns,19 maintains that his biggest contributions to future 
generations were in the form of his ideological shift of maintaining Christianity 
in the minds of his people,20 as well as the reformation of the Byzantine army 
into what Cyril Mango describes as “a sort of 'New Model Army'-- an 
intensively trained infantry force versed in the tactics of guerrilla warfare and 
trained with religious fervour.”21  While these are important concepts and 
certainly help add to the argument of him as a Father of the Byzantine Art of 
War, they are beyond the focus of this study, which is limited to the strategical 
components that make their way into On Skirmishing.   
 Heraclius's first campaign, although brief, started in 622, where he 
successfully evaded the Persian armies in Anatolia and marched into Armenia, 
threatening to invade Persia.  Unlike in later periods, Theophanes is rather 
descriptive of Heraclius's military matters, although he is still a bit confused and 
jumbled on the time lines.22 Despite the confusion, Theophanes description of 
the Persian reaction in the opening is most helpful: 
 
Evading the Persians, however, he turned round and invaded 
Persia [from Pontus].  When the barbarians learnt of this, they 
were cast down by the unexpectedness of his invasion.  As for 
Sarbaros, the Persian commander, he took his forces and came 
to Cilicia that he might turn the Emperor round by his attack 
on Roman territory.  Fearing, however, lest the emperor 
invade Persia by way of Armenia and cause disturbance 
therein, he could not make up his mind what to do.23 
 
Firstly, Heraclius's threat of invading Persia through Armenia, despite how 
badly the Persians had been winning the war, put one enemy commander in a 
rather nasty dilemma: try to invade deeper Byzantine territory and force 
Heraclius back, or pursue Heraclius to prevent an invasion of Persia.  At first 
                                                
19 James Howard-Johnston, East Rome, Sasanian Persia And the End of Antiquity: 
Historiographical And Historical Studies (Ashgate Publishing, 2006), viii 42.  
20 Johnston,  viii 44. 
21  Oxford History of Byzantium, edited by Cyril Mango (Oxford University Press, USA, 
2002), 55. See also, A. Sharf, “Heraclius and Mahommet,” in Past and Present, No. 9 (Apr., 1956): 
1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/650039 (accessed December 12th, 2008). 
22 Johnston, viii 22.  See also N. Oikonomides, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies: vol 1 
1975, “A Chronological Note on the first Campaign of Heraclius (622).” Oikonomides places the 
campaign in July 622 based off of the eclipse that year which Pisides specifically refers to; this 
contrasts with Theophanes placement in the winter of 622-3, one of his many chronological errors. 
23  Theophanes the Confessor, The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and 
Near Eastern History, AD 284-813, translation, introduction, and commentary by Cyril Mango and 
Roger Scott, with the assistance of Geoffrey Greatrex,(Oxford University Press, 1997), 436-7. 
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Sarbaros tried the former, but when Heraclius failed to budge despite a 
threatening invasion of Cilicia, the Persian commander feared for the safety of 
Persia itself and was forced to follow Heraclius into the unfavorable Armenian 
hills. After unsuccessful skirmishing in a hostile country, Sarbaros was forced to 
give battle, wherein Heraclius won a clear victory with a feigned retreat.24  Poor 
Sarbaros, as George of pisidia puts it, “Was thus dragged after the emperor 
against his will, like a dog on a chain..”25 With the Persian threat temporarily 
stymied, Heraclius retired to winter quarters back in Byzantium.26 
 The willingness to abandon territory temporarily when necessary was 
to become perhaps the biggest hallmark and central core of later Byzantine 
strategy, and it all started with Heraclius in 622.  While the raiding parties sent 
by the Arabs in the 8th century were not threatening to take land but merely steal 
resources,cause damage, and create chaos, the Arabs still mounted many large 
invasions of Byzantine territory, and true to Heraclius's example, the Byzantine 
generals consistently and willingly conceded territory to these invaders in order 
to deal with them at a more suitable place and time.27  While Heraclius might 
have had the audacity and skill to invade the enemy lands where later 
commanders did not, the concept of giving up land in order to force the enemy 
to fight on one's own terms that was carried on in later generations much defies 
the common military thought before that time. One example of pre-Heraclian 
military thought is in the reign of Justinian, who repeatedly sent Belisarius to 
engage Chosroes I on the Byzantine border despite being at a great disadvantage 
every time.  In that case, Justinian was saved by the skill of his general, but at 
other times this short-sighted policy ended up disastrously.  This is shown even 
in Heraclius's time from the continuous defeats from the beginning of the war in 
602-620, where the Byzantines insisted on meeting the Persian armies as soon as 
they could engage them, and repeatedly were sent home with a drubbing. Two 
notable examples include the early losses at Daras in 603-4 and Heraclius's total 
defeat at Antioch in 613.28 Of course, these rash policies continued after 
                                                
24 Theophanes, 437. 
25 George of Pisidia, “Expeditio Persica,” 357-8, quoted in Norman H Baynes,  “The First 
Campaign of Heraclius against Persia,” The English Historical Review 19, no. 76 (October, 1904): 
pp. 694-702.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/548613 (accessed December 12th, 2008), 701.  
26 For a detailed analysis of the 622 campaign using George of Pisidia to account and 
correct Theophane's errors, see Baynes, 694, 697-702 and Oikonomides.  The latter argues that the 
campaign was not very significant because other sources like the Chronicon Paschale ignore it and 
Pisidia treated it like he does other unimportant events, filling the space with random matters.  
Oikonomides states that the campaign served as a confidence booster, helped raise the blockades in 
Pontus, and gave Heraclius breathing room to train his army. 
27 Note that oftentimes the 'invaders' were merely raiding parties in search of booty and not 
out to capture territory.  In this sense it is incorrect to say that the Byzantines were willingly 
conceding territory, for there was no enemy capturing territory!  What is meant is that the 
Byzantines would not necessarily meet the enemy at the border but confront them later on, 
sometimes deep inside Byzantine lands.   
28 It is very likely, although impossible to prove, that Heraclius devised his campaigns after 
622 from reflecting upon his earlier failures.  It would make sense that, having seen the folly of 
attempting to fight the enemy on their terms to reduce damage to Byzantine territory, he would 
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Heraclius as well, such as at Anzen in 838.  This discrepancy shows two 
things:  first in that the lure to fight the enemy as quickly as possible to 
minimize the devastation to one's own country is very strong and not easily 
resisted, and also that, perhaps due to the previous point or for other reasons, the 
value of Heraclius's techniques was not fully understood.  Either way, while he 
did pave the way for the future successful Byzantine strategy, it was not 
universally followed in all circumstances. 
 While Heraclius's brief 622 campaign contained an important lesson for 
future Byzantine generals, his next campaign from 624-5 demonstrated his 
strategy in substantial depth. Like in 622, Heraclius began the campaign by 
threatening to invade Persia through the Armenian route in hopes to draw off the 
Persian armies in Byzantine territory.  And again, the threat of his invasion was 
successful, as Theophanes records: 
 
And on 20 April the emperor invaded Persia.  When Chosroes 
[II] learnt of this, he ordered Sarbarazas to turn back [from 
Anatolia]; and having gathered his armies from all of Persia, 
he entrusted them to Sain, whom he commanded to join 
Sarbarazas with all speed and so proceed against the 
emperor.29 
 
Once again, a Persian army, this time under the illustrious and previously 
successful Sarbarazas, was forced to return to Persia from another dissuaded 
invasion of Anatolia to defend against Heraclius.  In total, Chosroes sent three 
armies after Heraclius, who managed to prevent a concentration of the Persian 
armies and defeated them one by one.30 This feat was unparalleled both in the 
magnitude of victory in such a small time as well as the methods used to achieve 
it. Previously, Byzantine armies relied upon keeping a secure line of 
communications, and moving to meet their opponents head on as to not 
endanger their communications and retreat.  However, as Johnston describes, 
“He [Heraclius] prepared to move between enemy armies (something which was 
anathema to sixth-century Roman generals), confident that he could move faster 
and would be able to use a temporarily superior concentration of his forces to 
dispose of Persian armies in detail.”31    
 While otherwise the following would belong in the post-Heraclius 
analysis, a passage of Theophanes which gives a brief allusion to the defeat of a 
large Muslim invasion in 740 bears great similarity to Heraclius's triple defeat of 
the Persian commanders in early 625. In 740, when the Arab invaders split up 
their extremely large army into several smaller components, two parts of it were 
defeated in turn by a concentrated Byzantine force that outmaneuvered and 
                                                                                                         
instead want to use the same stratagem on the enemy, while letting the time-tested walls of 
Constantinople hold off any serious assaults. 
29 Ibid,  439. 
30 Ibid, 439-41. 
31 Johnston,  viii 36. 
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marched between the Arab armies. While the rest of the Arabs retreated 
safely, perhaps because of the fate of their friends, this battle is still notable for 
being one of the rare Byzantine straight up battle victories.  While he does not 
describe anything specific, one can infer that given the size of the invasion 
force, the concentration of the Byzantine armies was necessary to destroy those 
two parts in succession.32 
  Dealing with a separated army is mentioned several times in 
Skirmishing and the author gave several methods to exploit it. First, the 
Byzantines were to shadow the detachments and harass them to prevent them 
from foraging.  Next, if they were plundering the countryside to ambush them, 
preferably near a village. 33  Lastly, they were to attack the baggage train.34 
However, due to the vague wording and lack of detail from Theophanes, it is 
difficult to discern what approach the Byzantines used to defeat these 
detachments.  While it could be that the strategoi won by wearing down the 
armies over time in accordance with Skirmishing harassment strategy, there is 
also another, more likely possibility. 
 Rather than focusing on wearing down each army with Fabian 
maneuvers, the Byzantines also could have kept their whole army together and 
marched and counter marched to defeat these enemy armies one by one.  This 
would closely mirror Heraclius's campaign of 625, where he maneuvered 
between and defeated three separate Persian armies one at a time. Given that 
Heraclius's strategy was unheard of at the time35 and being a rather advanced 
military strategy that was only fully exploited over a millennium later under 
Napoleon, it is much more logical that the 740 campaign strategy was based on 
knowledge of Heraclius's previous campaigns. 
 When continuing with Heraclius, it is worth paying closer attention to 
the battle against Sarbaros as Heraclius's night attack tactic is also written about 
in On Skirmishing. Theophanes, unfortunately, does not go into the depth that 
the treatise does, making analysis awkward and  limited at best.36  Thus, it is 
more profitable in this circumstance to compare the advice in On Skirmishing to 
                                                
32 Theophanes,  571. 
33 On Skirmishing, 229. 
34 On Skirmishing, 175-9. 
35 Johnston,  viii 36. 
36   Here is the passage, which still provides some information and could match 
with Maurice's advice, but there simply aren't enough details to be sure: “The winter, 
then, having set in, and Sarbaros not suspecting anything, he [Heraclius] selected the 
strongest horses and the bravest soldiers and divided them into two.  The first part he 
ordered to move ahead against Sarbaros, whilst he himself followed behind with the 
rest...The Persians who were there became aware of the attack: they rose up and rushed to 
resist, but the Romans slew all of them...When Herakleios had taken these things [loot], 
he moved against the Persians who were scattered in the villages.  These men, on 
learning of the flight of Sarbaros, also fled without restraint.” Theophanes, 443.  
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that Maurice's Strategicon, which is likely where Heraclius took his strategy 
from37: 
 
 When the army gets close to the enemy, then they 
should rest under cover, straighten out their line and, 
depending on the terrain, launch their attack from two or three 
sides.  It should not be made from all four sides, for then the 
enemy finding themselves completely surrounded will be 
forced to close ranks and fight, but one side should be left 




When compared with On Skirmishing, there are not as many major differences 
between the strategies proposed as there were in the ambushing case. Maurice 
advises the general to not only flank the enemy from three sides, but also shows 
admirable foresight in the suggestion of leaving a path open for them to retreat.  
However, On Skirmishing takes this form one step further:  : 
 
You should launch your attack from the rear with infantry 
units.  Divide the remaining infantry into six divisions; station 
three off to the right side of the enemy, and three off to the 
left...Leave open and unguarded the road, and that alone, 
which provides safe passage for the enemy toward their own 
land.  After they have been vigorously assaulted and they 
discover the open road, beguiled by the idea of being saved, of 
fleeing the battle, and of getting back to their own land, they 
mount their horses and race along that road to escape, each 
man concerned only about his own safety...He [the general]  
should occupy the mountain heights [on the enemy's path of 
retreat] and also secure the road passing through...hasten to 
seize the passes before they do and without delay launch your 
attack directly against them.  39  
 
First, note that the plan in On Skirmishing is extremely similar to what Maurice 
proposed. This makes it exceedingly likely that the strategy in On Skirmishing is 
something built from the.  Overall, the key difference is that On Skirmishing 
advises the necessity of exploiting the enemy's retreat for maximum effect.  
While the Strategicon is content with merely executing the night attack and 
winning the battle, the refined form in On Skirmishing tries to exploit the attack 
                                                
37  See W.E Kaegi, Heraclius, Emperor of Byzantium, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
130. For the recommendation of night attacks against the Persian camp by Maurice, see Strategicon, 
115.  For the detail of ambushing, see Strategicon,  94-96. 
38  Strategicon,  96.   
39 On Skirmishing,  235-7. 
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for maximum success by cutting off the scattered enemy's retreat to their 
country after the battle.  While a general following the plan set forth in the 
Strategicon would win the battle and force the enemy to retreat, a general using 
the plan in On Skirmishing would win the battle and make sure to destroy as 
much of the enemy army as he could after the battle was over.   
 The difference in night attack advice is not only a improvement over 
time, but also an evolution in strategic thought that matches with general 
Byzantine strategy.  The entire goal of the strategy in On Skirmishing is to be 
able to limit one's own losses while inflicting the maximum number of losses on 
the enemy.  By comparing the differences between the advice Strategicon and 
On Skirmishing, one can clearly see the evolution in strategy and ideology from 
the 6th century to the 10th.  
 Despite Heraclius's great success in defeating three Persian armies and 
forestalling another invasion of Byzantium, he was still in a tight situation. The 
Emperor was forced to conduct a rapid retreat against the skilled Sarbarazas, 
who was attempting to encircle Heraclius and cut off his retreat, and Heraclius 
only barely managed to escape back to safety.40  With Heraclius no longer 
threatening Persia,  a grand Persian invasion of Anatolia was launched, aiming 
for Constantinople itself in combination with the mighty Avar host from the 
north.  
 Yet again, Heraclius ignored the threat to Constantinople and 
Byzantine territory and instead raced off towards the northeast to deal with 
another army invading from Armenia while dropping a detachment back to 
Constantinople to defend.  Johnston describes this action as “another 
disconcerting move that probably took the Persians by surprise.  For it was 
surely inconceivable that the emperor would not hurry to the defence of his 
capital when it was clearly under threat.”41  Heraclius proceeded to defeat this 
army under Sain, which apparently was such an unexpected and great victory 
that Theophanes relates that Sain died of “his great despondency” and how 
Chosroes preserved Sain's body in salt to further mistreat it for his failure. 42  
While Heraclius was off defeating Sain,  the siege of Constantinople was 
underway by an Avar host on the European side that was said to be numbered 
80,000, as well as with support from the Persian army under Sarbarazas.43  Yet 
thanks to the earlier preparations, plans, and instructions  by Heraclius, as well 
as the detachment he sent there before setting out to defeat Sain, and of course 
the naturally strong defenses of Constantinople, the storm was weathered and 
the Avars retreated in disgrace.44 Following his defeat of Sain, Heraclius set 
                                                
40 Theophanes, 443-5. Kaegi also provides a helpful interpretation using non-Byzantine 
sources.  cf. Kaegi, 130-2. 
41 Johnston, viii 19. 
42 Chronographia, 446-7.  Theophanes incorrectly attributes this victory to Heraclius's 
brother Theodore and is overall very confused in this timeframe.  For an attempt to unravel 
Theophanes messy chronology, see Johnston, viii 22-4. 
43 For further coverage of the siege of Constantinople, see Chronicon Paschale, translation, 
notes, and introduction by Mark and Mary Whittby, (Liverpool University Press, 1989). 
44 Theophanes, 446-8. 
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out to invade Persia once again. Theophanes briefly describes his motives, 
saying,  “After encouraging his army, the emperor pushed on against Chosroes 
with a view to frightening him and making him recall Sarbaros from Byzantium 
[Chalcedon].”45 This recall is of a considerably greater magnitude than the 
previous ones, for this time Sarbaros was all the way at Chalcedon, within close 
proximity to Constantinople itself.  However, Sarbaros refused to return, instead 
assisting the Avars with the siege until its eventual failure.  With the defeat of 
another Persian army, Heraclius invaded Persia once more in 627 and defeated a 
fresh Persian army at Nineveh.46  This led to a surrender not too long after the 
stubborn Chosroes, refusing to accept defeat, was murdered in a coup d'etat in 
628.  Despite the enormous gains Chosroes had made from 602-623, Heraclius 
was able to reverse the situation and force a humiliating surrender in just six 
years of campaigning.  Given his extraordinary success, it is no surprise that his 
techniques are prominently featured in On Skirmishing. 
 While the author of On Skirmishing attributes the strategy of invading 
the enemy homeland to Leo VI's military book, this advice directly matches with 
all of Heraclius's campaigns and it is quite conceivable that Leo took it from 
Heraclius. This counter-invasion strategy is a very significant part of On 
Skirmishing because it is the final, last resort approach in the face of a skilled 
opponent who refuses to fall for any of the normal traps or be weakened by 
harassment: 
 
Therefore, General, when you are at a loss about how to injure 
the enemy with stratagems and ambushes, because they are 
very cautious and guard themselves carefully, or if, on the 
other hand, it is because your forces are not up to facing them 
openly in battle, then this is what you ought to do.  Either you 
march quickly against the lands of the enemy, leaving the 
most responsible of the other generals behind, with enough 
troops for skirmishing and for the security of the 
themes...When the enemy hear of this, they will force their 
leader, even if he is unwilling, to get back to defend their own 
country.47 
 
Heraclius's campaigns mimic the scenario set forth here almost exactly.  Three 
times Heraclius threatened Persia despite the Persians controlling and 
threatening a large swathe of Byzantine territory, and three times he was 
successful when numerous earlier attempts to stop the Persians at the gates of 
the Empire had failed.  The first time, Sarbaros was conflicted over what option 
to take, but after seeing Heraclius refuse to budge from Armenia in response to a 
threatened invasion of Cilicia and fearing for the Persian homeland's safety, he 
followed Heraclius and was subsequently defeated in unfavorable territory.  
                                                
45 Theophanes,  450.  
46 Theophanes, 450-7. 
47 On Skirmishing,  221. 
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Following this ignominious defeat, Sarbarazas was forcibly recalled by 
Chosroes to defend Persia, only to find defeat along with two fellow Persian 
armies.  Lastly, the threat of invasion in 627 tipped Chosroes's hand to order 
Sarbaros to return despite having advanced all the way to Chalcedon, and while 
the latter did not due to suspicions about the King of Kings, it still shows the 
pull of Heraclius's strategy and why the consistent outcome of forcing the enemy 
army to retreat is repeated in On Skirmishing; it was that powerful of a 
maneuver, and like his triple victory through speedy maneuvering in 625, a 
strategy well beyond its time.48    
 One last area of Heraclius's campaigns to look at is the ending, where 
he was able to instigate a revolt of Chosroes and get a favorable ending to the 
war without having to commit the large amount of resources in a siege of the 
great city of Ctesiphon.  Winning without a costly siege is all the more 
remarkable because Heraclius was able to completely reverse nineteen years of 
disaster in just six years of his own fractured campaigning.  Even as late as 626 
the war was well in the favor of the Persians.  Yet two years later Heraclius was 
able to get the Persians to revolt and topple their King of Kings who had nearly 
done what no Persian King ever had been near to accomplishing: the complete 
defeat of the Eastern Empire. A feat which surely ranks among the very greatest 
in the annals of Byzantine history.  While there is no place in On Skirmishing for 
a lengthy offensive siege, the strategy set forth in Niceophorus Ouranos's 
Tactica bares a heavy resemblance to Heraclius's 'capture' of Ctesiphon.   
 According to Theophanes, Heraclius in 627 was “burning the towns 
and villages of Persia and putting to the sword the Persians he captured” while 
Chosroes was struggling to organize a new army to oppose him after the defeat 
of Sain and the refusal of Sarbarazas to return to Persia.49  After some time he 
was able to organize a force under Razates, whom Heraclius decisively defeated 
outside of Ninevah. After this victory, the remaining Persian forces were left to 
shadowing Heraclius while the Emperor roamed around destroying palaces, 
capturing the Persian storehouse at Dastagerd, and marching all over in pursuit 
of Chosroes, who ended up fleeing to Ctesiphon.50  Along the way, he wrote 
another letter to Chosroes asking for peace and after hearing another refusal, 
Heraclius proceeded to burn all the villages and towns within reach for an entire 
month. After doing so, he was contacted by dissatisfied Persians who wished to 
overthrow Chosroes, and Heraclius gave them his support and got Byzantine 
prisoners released.  The coup was successful, and Chosroes' son Siroes, one of 
the conspirators, was placed on the throne, and he was only too glad to sign a 
treaty of peace with Heraclius.51  It is worth mentioning that Heraclius never 
                                                
48 There is no evidence for any strategic theory of this type of strategy before Heraclius.  
The Strategicon specifically says that the two times when one should invade a hostile country are 
when the enemy was defeated in battle or when they are unprepared for combat.  Neither of these 
examples fit in with Heraclius's situation, where it was only the Byzantines who were defeated in 
battle and neither side unprepared for combat. See Strategicon, 9.3 96. 
49 Theophanes, 448-9. 
50 Theophanes, 448-53. 
51 Theophanes, 453-5. 
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even bothered to lay siege or even approach Ctesiphon, which would have 
been the normal way of approach, but instead roamed around the countryside, 
destroying and ravaging all of the Persian lands. While siege would have been 
very difficult to initiate with the Nahrawan canal providing a safe barrier of 
defense, Heraclius's approach towards his end goal was exceedingly efficient. 
 While Theophanes gives a good overview, his account requires closer 
examination.  Here, Johnston has done a huge service in piecing together a 
multitude of sources to provide a clearer picture of Heraclius's final campaign.  
He finds that the rebellion was made possible with a combination of the 
Byzantine political alliance with the Turks to threaten various parts of Persia, 
the Byzantine religious propaganda, and most importantly, the continual success 
of Heraclius in the field along with his devastation of Mesopotamia and decision 
to press for Ctesiphon rather than liberate captured Byzantine territories.  On the 
Persian side, Johnston has found that the combination of war weariness and 
economic troubles, quite natural problems for sustaining a twenty-five year long 
war, as well as the arrogance of Chosroes caused by his many successes, 
contributed most to internal grumbling.   Johnston concludes that, “His 
[Heraclius] actions created the circumstances in which opposition to the existing 
regime and its policies could gather strength.”52  To this I have to stress the 
decision of Heraclius to continually ravage and destroy the Persian lands, not 
only hurting their economy and contributing to the dissatisfaction of the land 
owners, but also his isolation of Ctesiphon, and the propaganda which gave 
room for rebellion to form.  As Johnston says, even in 628 Chosroes still 
enjoyed an “immense advantage in material resources.”53 Thus, the decisive 
factor had to have been psychological in nature, to make the Persians believe 
they did not have that advantage, and that a quick rebellion and subsequent 
surrender would be most advantageous. 
 Now compare Heraclius's approach with that of chapter 65 on siege 
warfare in Nicephorus Ouranos' Tactica.  Ouranos first advises to avoid 
attacking a strong fortress with a powerful garrison, of which Ctesiphon would 
certainly qualify.54  Instead he suggests to go to all nearby regions, strongholds, 
and fortresses and burn their crops/harvests so that the populace is oppressed by 
starvation and moves to other places.  While ravaging the land, the Byzantine 
army should also restrict traffic to the city under siege, preventing not only an 
commercial visitors but also any enemy food or food or reinforcements from 
arriving anywhere near the fortress.  This should help drive the besieged to 
despair. Lastly, the general should give incentives for the fortress to surrender 
such as promising lenient terms at the first request and spreading religious 
dissatisfaction.55 While the outcome is much different between Ouranos and 
Heraclius, that of the fortress surrendering versus fostering a rebellion, this is 
                                                
52 Johnston, ix, 108-13. 
53 Johnston ix, 113. 
54 McGeer, Sowing the Dragon's Teeth, Tactica, 65.1. 
55 McGeer, Tactica, 65.2-3, 6-10. 
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merely because of the difference of situations; the techniques described still 
apply for either goal, although rebellion may naturally be more difficult. 
 Ouranos may have stated that “many and varied are the means which 
the men of old contrived for conducting siege operations, but I have set down 
only the methods that our generation currently employs,” but while even if he 
did not get direct inspiration from Heraclius's campaign against Ctesiphon, the 
strategy executed by Heraclius is too similar of a match to the strategy 
prescribed by Ouranos to be ignored.56  It is quite conceivable that the sources 
he obtained this indirect siege strategy from was part of a long tradition that 
originated with Heraclius, or he may have known of the link to Heraclius yet 
chosen not to say anything for various reasons. Yet ultimately, as with many 
other tenuous links in strategic evolution, we are left to wonder exactly how 
much and in what way the older examples influenced the later texts. 
 While Heraclius may not have contributed to some of very specific 
tactics addressed in On Skirmishing, he did the most important thing, which was 
to show the potential for a defense based on conceding territory when necessary 
and fighting the enemy on one's own terms.  While Heraclius executed this 
strategy by threatening Persia itself and then defeating the various Persian 
armies with a combination of outmaneuvering and a set of stratagems, his 
successors elected to permit the Arab armies to invade Byzantine lands while 
wearing them down over time by attacking their stragglers and limiting their 
forage, then blocking their retreat.  This type strategy led to the success of Leo 
III in almost a mirror of Heraclius's campaign in 717. With the exception of 
remaining in Byzantium, Leo allowed the Muslims to advance all the way to 
Constantinople, all while remaining on the flank and pouncing on 
reinforcements and foragers. Like in 626, the walls of Constantinople held, and 
the invading army was bled dry by a terrible winter and lack of forage, leading 
to a Muslim defeat of an unprecedented scale, to the extent that they never 
threatened Constantinople again.57   
 Before entering into the analysis, it will be useful to understand the 
context that On Skirmishing was written for.  Byzantium had lost their richest 
provinces, that of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Africa in the 7th and 8th centuries 
to the Arabs.  They were permanently on the defensive, having not the economic 
resources to continue fighting on even footing against the numerically superior 
Arabs.  Instead, the Byzantines fought like guerrillas, using small, well-led 
bands of men drawn from the province itself to wear down the enemy with 
efficient military actions.  Speed and surprise were the themes of the day, with 
light cavalry being the dominant arm of the military up until the 10th century. 
After the defeat of several successive invasion forces, the Arabs were also 
generally reduced to sending in raiding parties to enrich themselves at the 
expense of Byzantium, and at times the Byzantines replied in kind.  Overall, it 
was a period unlike any other in the classical world or late antiquity. 
                                                
56 McGeer, Tactica, 65.25. 
57 Theophanes, 546; 549.  This strategy of denying forage and harassing the enemy who is 
besieging a city is discussed in On Skirmishing, 223-5. 
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641-800: The Second Evolution 
 
 Heraclius had shown and given an original set of principles to follow 
through his successful campaigns, and the early subsequent generations proved 
capable of limiting the large battle encounters that devastated the Empire's 
position at Yarmuk.  This is where there are relatively few large scale battles in 
the immediate half a century after Heraclius's death, and it is in no small part 
due to the absence of any Yarmuk scale disasters that the Empire's tenuous 
position was held. While the level of detail given from Theophanes is often 
scant if even that, in those instances where he does give even the slightest bit of 
information we can see that the Byzantine military commanders were applying 
many of the later strategies in an imperfect and isolated form.58 That is to say, 
they would use some good strategies but lack others needed to maximize the 
success, or that their imperfect combinations would lead to a defeat in a situation 
that later commanders would find complete victory in. This unique situation of 
using some of the concepts that would make up On Skirmishing, but never all at 
once, provides a good glimpse of what the strategic situation was during the era 
following Yarmuk: a military trying to find the answer for their continual 
failures by the continual implementation of various ideas in a variety of forms.  
Some of these ideas stuck, and some did not; it was a gradual learning process 
that ultimately led to the full Art of War expressed in On Skirmishing. So one 
must keep in mind while reading the analysis that in this period the Byzantines 
did not have a copy of On Skirmishing by their bedside and were simply 
executing its directions incorrectly. Instead, it is much likelier that they did not 
have a full, detailed plan to follow and were  It is important to point out that 
Theophanes does give other examples of military encounters during this period, 
this study will restrict the analysis and selections to those that show some 
resemblance to the concepts put forth in On Skirmishing. 
 The first example Theophanes gives of higher level strategy is of a 
Byzantine raid of Syria in 699, which went all the way up to Samosata on the 
upper Euphrates; a sizable distance from the Byzantine homeland.  Not only 
were the Byzantines predominantly on the defensive during this period, but this 
strategy was also unique in that it was done when the Muslims under 
Muhammed b. Marwan were busy invading a third party's land.59 The idea of 
invading with great haste when the enemy was certainly not a new one, although 
it was still covered in On Skirmishing as a way to exploit any potential 
opening.60 This was the only offensive military success that Theophanes gives 
                                                
58 I am taking every piece of evidence Theophanes  offers that can at least some level of 
strategy can be discerned from.  As he his focus post-Heraclius is not fully military based and he has 
much to cover, a short paragraph is the most one can find on any given encounter. 
59 Theophanes, 518. 
60 On Skirmishing, 221.This also partially relates with Heraclius's multiple invasions of 
Persia itself when the enemy armies were away although in that case it was because the Persians 
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during the  long time period from Heraclius up until the 8th century.  
Evidently, the  situation of an enemy occupied invading a foreign land was not a 
frequent one, for it was only briefly addressed in On Skirmishing and with its 
unusual level of success one would think that the Byzantines would wish to 
emulate it in the future; thus the likely conclusion is that it was simply a rare 
opportunity well exploited. 
 Continuing on the trend of brief information, Theophanes gives a vague 
description of a successful ambush in the early 8th century.  Although his lack of 
detail restricts the analysis of what kind of ambush it was, we can infer that it 
was performed on the advance of the enemy army and not their retreat: 
 
Furthermore, while Mardasan was raiding with his Arab army 
from Pylai to Nicaea and Nicomedia, the imperial officers 
who, like Mardaites, were concealed with their foot soldiers at 
Libos and Sophon, suddenly attacked them and broke them in 
pieces and so forced them to withdraw from those parts...61 
 
While On Skirmishing does provide details of how to ambush62 and gives the 
suggestion of ambushing or at least blocking the enemy's advance with infantry 
stationed in tough terrain,63 the author wisely recommends that the general wait 
until the enemy retreats to ambush them.64 Nevertheless, ambushing on the 
advance was not spoken of poorly, just as an inferior option to ambushing on the 
retreat. 
 Next, Theophanes gives another, more concrete example of a Byzantine 
force picking off raiding and foraging parties with the defeat of a detachment 
under one of Harun al-Rashid's generals. Although as usual Theophanes lacks 
precise statements of what occurred, it is likely that the “small raiding party” 
stated was either a foraging party or a detachment sent to pillage an adjacent 
area.  Either way, it fits under the treatise.  And furthermore, if Theophanes 
deemed it worthy enough to mention alongside other much larger events, it must 
have had some significance towards the outcome of the invasion: 
 
                                                                                                         
were invading Byzantium and not a third party; c.f. Theophanes, pp. 435-479. A more applicable 
precedent for this type of strategy can be tracked to Belisarius's quick raid into Persia in 541,when 
Chosroes had invaded Colchis with a large army and was laying siege to Petra. Upon hearing news 
that Belisarius captured a fortress in the heart of Mesopotamia and sent a raiding party beyond the 
Tigris river, Chosroes abandoned the invasion and speedily retired back to Persia to deal with the 
intruder, who had already left for home, his purpose accomplished; cf. Procopius of Caesarea, 
“History of the Wars, Books 5-6,” trans. H.B Dewing,  (Project Gutenberg, 27 September 2005), 
Book 2, xvi-xix,  http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/20298 accessed December 20 2008. 
61 Theophanes,  546. 
62 On Skirmishing,  147-179. Specifically pp. 155-7 provides the most detail on ambushing 
on the enemy advance path. Another area which covers ambushing on the retreat, although not fully 
applicable here it still goes over some general ambushing strategies, is on pp.  211-3. 
63 Ibid, 155-7. 
64 Ibid, 157-61 
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Aaron, [Harun al-Rashid] after invading the Armeniac thema, 
bessieged all summer the fort Semalouos and in the month of 
September he took it by capitulation.  He had previously sent 
Thoumamas to Asia with 50,000 men.  A small raiding party 
of his was met by Michael Lachanodrakon, who gave battle 
and killed the brother of Thoumamas.65 
 
Although this victory was small and produced only limited physical results, it is 
still notable for a success of defeating an isolated detachment in an otherwise 
unsuccessful invasion defense.  This aspect of limiting food supplies and 
harassing any detachments is addressed numerous times in On Skirmishing and 
is clearly one of the most important subjects to the author.66   
 Partially parting with brief and inconclusive statements, Theophanes 
starts to give better descriptions and therefore examples towards the end of his 
chronicles. One of the more detailed examples comes from a campaign in 770, 
where part of what would become skirmishing strategy is applied, but not the 
complete form.   When the emperor heard of the invasion of Banakas and the 
siege of Syke, he sent three strategoi who did the following: 
 
 These men arrived and occupied the Arabs' exit, which was a 
very difficult mountain pass.  Meanwhile the fleet of the 
Kibyraiots under their strategos the  spatharios Petronas cast 
anchor in the harbour of the fort.  On seeing this and losing all 
hope, Banakas encouraged and roused his men.  He marched 
up to the cavalry themata and, with a great shout, routed them.  
He killed many of them and, after devastating all the 
surrounding country, returned home with much booty.67 
 
In this scenario, the strategoi had done the correct maneuver of blocking their 
opponent's retreat as described below: 
 
Still, instead of confronting the enemy as they are on their way 
to invade Romania, it is in many respects more advantageous 
and convenient to get them as they are returning from our 
country to their own.  They will be worn out and much the 
worse for wear after having spent such a long time in the 
Roman lands...The general, therefore, must never let them 
return home unscathed.68 
 
                                                
65 Theophanes,  625. 
66 See On Skirmishing,  175-9, 229, for further information and the other major references 
to hampering the enemy food supplying. 
67 Theophanes,  615. 
68 On Skirmishing, 158-60. 
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However, they didn't attempt to weaken their foe before they retreated home 
as On Skirmishing  recommends.69   Thus, the enemy was able to overpower the 
blockade despite the disadvantage in attacking such a strong position, because 
the strategoi had neglected to weaken the invaders before the ambush.  
Nevertheless, the power of this manoeuver sur les derrieres advised in On 
Skirmishing is clear, for it caused Banakas and his men to lose all hope despite 
coming back from a successful raid and it was only the strength of his resolve 
and the good condition of his army .  While this may still have been a great 
defeat for the Byzantines, it shows marked improvement over the earlier 
disasters of offering direct battle such as that under Justinian II.70. 
 Eight years later, there is a campaign which demonstrates the complete 
opposite of the failure to stop Banakas in 770 by neglecting to put his army in a 
poor condition in preparation to force and block their retreat.  This time, the 
Emperor himself dictated the overall strategy in response to a great Arab 
invasion lead by Hasan b. Qahtaba in 778: 
 
The emperor [Leo IV] ordered the strategoi not to fight an 
open war, but to make the forts secure by stationing garrisons 
of soldiers in them.  He appointed high-ranking officers at 
each fort and instructed them to take each 3,000 chosen men 
and to follow the Arabs so as to prevent them from spreading 
out on pillaging raids, while burning in advance the horses' 
pasture and whatever other supplies were to be found.  After 
the Arabs remained fifteen days at Dorylaion, they ran short of 
necessities and their horses went hungry and many of them 
perished.  Turning back, they besieged Amorion for one day, 
but finding it fortified and well-armed, they withdrew without 
achieving any success.71 
 
Here, the Byzantines performed the first part of skirmishing correctly.  They 
were able to shadow the enemy detachments and prevent them from foraging or 
pillaging, and at the same time using a scorched earth policy to force the Arabs 
to limit their pillaging and destruction and force them to make an inglorious 
retreat.72 However, the final step would be for the Byzantines to maneuver upon 
the Arab's rear block their exits, ensuring the destruction or dissolution of the 
entire army. As the treatise describes: 
 
When the enemy are withdrawing and are hastening to reach 
their own country, our infantry forces should be dispatched 
                                                
69 Ibid,  165-173. 
70 Theophanes,  510-514. 
71 Theophanes,  624. 
72 On Skirmishing, 211.  “When some of the enemy ride about three or four miles from their 
arm, this detachment should attack and harass them there and there in order to prevent them from 
gathering food. When food becomes scarce, they may be compelled to turn back.” 
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beforehand to the mountain passes to hold the roads along which 
they will be passing.73 
 
By neglecting to block the enemy's retreat, the strategoi were able to achieve a 
half-victory: the Arabs were forced to abandon their unsuccessful raid, probably 
suffering from a reasonable amount of casualties from starvation and fatigue. 
However, their army was not destroyed like it would have been if the Byzantines 
had blocked the exits.  Yet, the Byzantines were learning.74 As early as the 
770's, Byzantines had executed two major parts of the plan that would be 
proposed in On Skirmishing to a reasonable degree, just not at the same time.  
As the strength of each part on its own showed, if the Byzantines had used the 
full strategy in the same campaign, it is all the more likely that in both cases 
there would have been a complete Byzantine victory. 
 However, even just a year or so later after the half-successful defense 
against the great invasion by Hasan, the Byzantines suffered a nasty defeat to a 
raiding party.  Rather than shadow, harass, and deny the enemy supplies and 
food, there was apparently either a stubborn strategoi who refused to adapt, or 
just as likely, a lack of a unified theory that all strategoi were supposed to 
follow. These poor generals obviously weren't caught up with the times: 
 
 In this year [789] an Arab raiding party went forth against the 
Roman country in the month of September and penetrated into 
the Anatolic thema, to a place called Kopidnadon.  The 
Roman strategoi joined forces and gave battle to them.  They 
were defeated and many were killed...75 
 
The concept of giving direct battle when at a numerical and/or qualitative 
disadvantage was frowned upon in On Skirmishing; this is of course no surprise 
when the entire treatise is written of ways to fight more efficiently than through 
direct battle, but it is worth mentioning that in the beginning the author 
specifically mentions that while directly offering battle may be the easiest 




Conclusion from Two Centuries of Evolution 
 
                                                
73 Ibid,  231. 
74  As this was a specific campaign at least formally directed by the Emperor Leo IV, it is 
likely at this point that there is at least some rudimentary understanding  As the 8th century came to a 
close, the Byzantines were able to show some successes that resulted from higher level strategy and 
even in their failures they could be seen attempting to rise to the next level of strategy.  However, as 
we shall see below, Byzantine policy was by no means unified or always efficient. 
75 Theophanes,  637. 
76 On Skirmishing,  147-153. 
96       Bob Ekkebus  
 The early 790's was the last decade of any military significance 
recorded by Theophanes, and as this study was limited to Theophanes' work, this 
is the natural place of closure.  However, it is not too much of an inappropriate 
time to halt overall. The the late 8th and earlier part of the 9th century was mostly 
devoted to non-military affairs, most notably the fanatical religious devotion by 
the state under Irene and the iconoclast controversy following her. What military 
attention there was focused on the Balkans, which had been neglected for 
several centuries. While the Empire still suffered eastern military defeats during 
this period, it is perhaps more apt to say that these did not matter as much to the 
state, and it follows that the value of examining this period for the evolution in 
strategy is likely minimal. It was not until Theophilus and Michael III that 
attention to eastern military matters improved, and from Michael on the fortunes 
of the Byzantines rose onto newfound heights of prosperity. 
 While there were some concepts, such as ambushing, that preceded 
Heraclius, the majority of the broad concepts that ended up in On Skirmishing 
mirror and can be taken from an analysis of his campaigns.  On Skirmishing 
gives an effective solution to every scenario Theophanes records in these two 
centuries, an almost certain indicator that its solutions were developed from the 
Byzantine successes in failures in what is commonly called the Byzantine 'Dark 
Ages.'  Politically and culturally that label may or may not be correct, but on 
military strategy, nothing could be farther from the truth.  By accumulation of 
theory, from sources such as Maurice's Strategikon and Leo's Taktika, mixed in 
with battle tested strategy taken from Heraclius and subsequent generations, the 
Byzantines were able to produce a successful strategy that saved them from the 
brink of disaster. 
 
 
 
